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From the employer's viewpoint, collective bargaining is all too
often a one way street favoring the union. Most clauses in the col-
lective bargaining contract are viewed as providing burdens for the
employer, not benefits: The employer shall pay specified rates; the
employer shall not transfer employees between shifts, etc. The tradi-
tional exceptions to this general rule are the so called management's
rights clause and the no-strike clause.
The management's rights clause is usually a broadly worded
paragraph which attempts to spell out what the company can do in
running its business.' But even this particular exception to the
general rule as to burdens fails to appear in a great many collective
bargaining contracts-often by design.'
* A.B., 1959, University of Pittsburgh; LL.B., 1962, Boalt Hall, University of
California; Member, Labor Law Committee, American Bar Association; Member,
Labor Law Committee, Bar Association of San Francisco; Staff Counsel, California
Metal Trades Association; private practice.
I Management Rights Clause. The management of the business and the direction
of the working force, including but not limited to the right to direct, plan, and control
plant operations, to establish or to change working schedules, to hire, promote, demote,
transfer, suspend, discipline, or discharge employees because of lack of sufficient work
or for other legitimate reasons, to make and enforce shop rules and regulations, to
introduce new and improved methods or facilities, or to change existing methods or
facilities, or to purchase supplies and service for the performance of its business, or to
determine the products to be manufactured and the process and means of manufacture,
are exclusively the right of the management of the company, and all other functions
and prerogatives herebefore vested in and/or exercised by management, remain solely
with management, and the union will not in any manner obstruct or abridge these
rights; provided that none of the above provisions shall be used for the purpose of
discriminating against any employee because of his or her membership in the union.
Should a dispute arise concerning these management rights or responsibilities, but
only to the extent that there is a conflict with a specific limitation expressed and
identified in a provision elsewhere in this Labor Agreement, the dispute should be
treated in accordance with the provisions of Article X (the grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure) of this Agreement.
2 Some employers believe that they retain all rights except those specifically
abridged or eliminated by the collective bargaining contract while other employers
believe that it is not possible to list "all" of the management's rights and to merely
list some is to risk faling into the trap of waiving many rights by specifying parti-
cular ones.
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The no-strike clause, however, appears in almost every collec-
tive bargaining contract? Typically this clause provides that during
the term of the collective bargaining contract, the union will not
cause a work stoppage. Sometimes this obligation is elaborately
stated.4 Some no-strike clauses provide that in the event of a work
stoppage the union shall perform certain affirmative acts, such as
posting a notice that the employees should cease the illegal strike
and return to work.5 Frequently, the no-strike clause provides that it
shall be "waived" if the employer fails to abide by the terms of the
grievance procedure. Often too, the no-strike clause sets forth a
promise by the employer that he will not lockout the employees dur-
ing the term of the collective bargaining contract. 6
Although rarely thought of as such, another clause that can be
a benefit to the employer if properly used, is the grievance procedure.
Grievance procedure clauses are found in most collective bargaining
contracts.7 Typically they provide several "steps" for processing dis-
putes, starting with a statement of the dispute at the plant floor level
between an employee, or his shop steward, and the line foreman, and
proceeding through a series of meetings between successively higher
levels of union representatives and company officials, and ending in
final binding arbitration.8 Indeed, in California, the existence of an
agreement in a collective bargaining contract to arbitrate all disputes
appears to imply a promise not to strike or lockout, even if no
express promise to that effect is included in the collective bargaining
contract.' This has been the interpretation by the courts. 10
8 The Bureau of National Affairs reports that some form of no-strike clause
appeared in 94% of the collective bargaining contracts in 1960. 47 L.R.R.M. 33 (1960).
4 No Strike-No Lockout. The union agrees that neither it nor any of the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit covered by this Agreement will collectively, concertedly
or individually engage in, instigate, support, condone or participate in, directly or
indirectly, any strike, slowdown or stoppage of work during the term of this Agreement
for any reason; and the company agrees that during the term of this Agreement it
will not lock out any of the employees covered by this Agreement because of a labor
dispute. The company retains the right to discipline or discharge any or all employees
who violate this provision.
5 Strikes and Lockouts. In the event a strike occurs which is unauthorized by the
union, the employer agrees that there shall be no liability on the part of the union, its
officers or agents, provided that union shall, as soon as possible after notification by
the employer that such action is unauthorized by the union, promptly take steps to
return its members to work.
6 Strikes and Lockouts. During the term of this Agreement, there shall be no
authorized strike by the union or lockout by the employer, provided the union and
the employer abide by the provisions of the grievance machinery.
7 The Bureau of National Affairs reports that 99% of the collective bargaining
contracts have grievance procedure. 46 L.R.R.M. 15 (1960).
8 1 CCH 1966 Lab. L. Rep. 59,521.
9 United Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Laborers', Local 89, 231 Cal. App. 2d 315, 41
Cal. Rptr. 816 (1964).
10 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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It is the author's contention in this article that more employers
should consider and use the grievance procedure clause as a "bene-
fit"; using it to collect damages from the union if the union breaches
the no-strike clause, and using it to force decision on unsettled and
disputed issues which appear to be in the employer's favor. Later,
ways are discussed by which this can be done. The opposing view
advises the employer to stay out of the grievance procedure because
if he is included, he waives his only effective remedy (injunction)
for union breach of the no-strike clause, and would also lose the
only effective deterrent (a large money judgment for damages) to
such strikes. 1
BACKGROUND
An analysis of the issues involved in this problem must begin
with an examination of the leading case of Drake Bakeries, Inc. v.
Local 50, American Bakery and Confectionery Workers," (here-
after cited as Drake Bakeries). In that case the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff employer's lawsuit against
the defendant labor union for damages caused by the union's alleged
breach of the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining contract
between the parties should be stayed pending arbitration of the
damage claim. The Court ruled that the grievance procedure clause
in the collective bargaining contract was broad enough to cover the
employer's claim, and since the employer had thereby agreed to
settle his disputes with the union in the grievance procedure, the
employer could not press his claim in court. In a companion case,
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,1" (hereinafter cited as Atkinson)
decided the same day, the Court ruled that the union's motion for a
stay of the plaintiff employer's damage suit was properly denied
because the grievance procedure permitted only employee or union,
not employer, claims, and therefore the employer could press his
damage claim in court.
Unfortunately for the attorney representing employers, most
grievance procedure clauses are not always as clearly written as the
clauses in dispute in Drake Bakeries and Atkinson. They do not
indicate clearly whether the employer has access to the grievance
procedure or not.14 And, of course the answer to this question is cru-
11 Lewis, The Long Pause, 14 LAB. L.J. 276 (1963) ; Spelfogel, Enforcement of
No-Strike Clause By Injunction, Damage Action and Discipline, 17 LAB. L.J. 67
(1962); Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MicH. L. Rv. 673
(1961).
12 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 370
U.S. 254 (1962).
13 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
14 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 370
U.S. 254, 264 n.13 (1962).
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cial to the attorney representing the employer who is seeking relief
from the union's breach of the no-strike clause. If the employer is
excluded from the grievance procedure, Atkinson allows the em-
ployer to go to court for his damages. However, the time limits for
filing a claim in the grievance procedures are usually of short dura-
tion compared to statutes of limitation for judicial action. If the
employer has incorrectly sought judicial relief, and a union motion
for a stay is granted, the employer's claim in arbitration may be
untimely. Correct assessment of the employer's present status in the
grievance procedure is also important to the employer's attorney in
advising his client on what position to take in labor negotiation for
a new contract. Whether the attorney adopts the view that the
employer should be in or out of the grievance procedure, he will
doubtless believe that this status should be clearly set forth. But,
attempts to change technical language can be an expensive and
frustrating exercise in collective bargaining-a field notorious for
"standard language" and borrowed clauses. The experience is
doubly frustrating if it is later found that the attempt was unneces-
sary. Yet the case law fails to furnish a certain guide-even with
regard to "standard" language. However, justice Douglas writing for
the majority in the leading case of United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 5 tells us:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular griev-
ance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail .... 0
Former Solicitor General Archibald Cox writes that "The typical
arbitration clause is written in words which cover, without limita-
tion, all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a
collective bargaining contract." 7 Not surprisingly then, courts
decide, as did the District Court in Franchi Construction Co. v.
Local 560, International Hod Carriers," that although the contract
does not expressly provide for employer access to the grievance pro-
cedure and although this particular employer has never attempted
to use the grievance procedure, nevertheless the agreement doesn't
15 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
16 Id. at 582-3, 584-5.
17 Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocxY MT.
L. REv. 247, 261 (1958).
18 248 F. Supp. 134 (1965).
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prohibit it, and in "my view [the court's] the grievance procedure is
available to either side."1 9
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF EMPLOYER GRIEVANCES ANALYZED
As stated above, ominous warnings come from some attorneys
representing employers that the employer should stay out of the
grievance procedure. They advise that if the employer's present
collective bargaining contract is ambiguous he should change it in
the next negotiation to clearly provide that the grievance procedure
is only for employee and union initiated grievances. 20 At the outset,
it must be noted that negotiating such a change in the grievance
procedure on the basis of such a technical argument is usually not a
small task. Unions are likely to resist it, and the employer, who is
frequently more concerned with immediate problems in collective
bargaining such as wage rates and cost of fringe benefits than he is
with technical issues, may not be willing to risk or take a strike
today to safeguard his protection against a strike he may have some
day in the future. Therefore, it is incumbent on the attorney advis-
ing the employer to pursue such a course to critically examine the
reasons given.
The argument is made that employer access to the grievance
procedure will preclude the employer from seeking injunctive relief
from union breach of the no-strike clause. And if an injunction alone
can effectively guard an employer's rights, this argument, if correct,
is weighty indeed. The reasoning behind this argument runs thus:
Drake Bakeries held that if an employer agreed to resolve all dis-
putes he had with the union in the grievance procedure he is
precluded from seeking judicial relief. But this argument goes
beyond the holding in Drake, and views too narrowly the traditional
basis for equitable relief. Drake merely held that the employer had
to arbitrate his claim for damages because, simply stated, he had
agreed to arbitrate all claims. Drake did not hold that the employer
was foreclosed from seeking any and all types of judicial relief.
Presumably, the employer in Drake could specifically enforce the
union's obligation to arbitrate all claims and perhaps obtain a con-
tempt citation if the union refused to comply.2 Moreover, equity has
traditionally provided injunctive relief precisely in those situations
where money damages, though available to the plaintiff, were an
inadequate remedy. There is no obvious reason why this long stand-
19 Id. at 137.
20 Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Action
and Discipline, 17 LAB. L.J. 67 (1962).
21 Sinclair Refining v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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ing maxim should become meaningless because the damages are
available in arbitration, rather than in court.
If the sole objection to having the employer in the grievance
procedure is that the employer will be deemed to have waived his
right to injunctive relief, the simple cure is careful wording of the
collective bargaining contract. The following brief statement could
be added to the no-strike clause: "In the event of a violation or
alleged violation of this provision of this Agreement, the grievance
and arbitration procedures of this Agreement shall not be the ex-
clusive remedy therefor, and neither party to this Agreement shall
be required, as a condition of maintaining any action at law or equity
with respect to said violation or alleged violation, to process its claim
or complaint for such violation under said grievance and arbitration
procedures."
Another method the employer may use to insure the availability
of injunctive relief from strikes in breach of a no-strike clause is to
provide for such a procedure in the grievance procedure itself. In
Ruppert v. Egelhafer,22 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a
lower court's confirmation of an arbitrator's award which was a
cease and desist order, in effect, injunctive relief. This rule is sup-
ported by the federal district court in New Orleans Steamship Asso-
ciation v. General Longshore Workers." Provision for arbitrator's
cease and desist orders could be obtained by adding such language
as the following to the grievance procedure:
Whenever either party to this Agreement has a grievance in which
he claims irreparable injury, he may appeal such grievance to Arbitra-
tor John Doe who shall, within twenty-four hours from receipt of
such a grievance, render a decision as to whether or not such a claim
of irreparable injury is well taken. It is expressly agreed by the par-
ties that said Arbitrator may issue such a cease and desist order as he
finds appropriate, and that the claiming party may have such order
confirmed in the appropriate court of law having jurisdiction over
this matter. Provided, however, that Arbitrator John Doe shall assess
the cost of such decision, including his fee, against the party making
such claim if the Arbitrator declines to grant the relief requested.
This clause not only provides an effective remedy for strikes in
violation of the no-strike clause, but it also vitiates the most fre-
quently stated reason for such strikes-ineffective or sluggish alter-
native remedies. The provision allowing the arbitrator to assess the
costs of unsuccessful resorts to this procedure could serve as a
deterrent to either party resorting to it for purely frivolous or "face
saving" purposes.
22 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
28 49 L.R.R.M. 2941, 44 CCH Lab. Cas. f1 17,575 (D. La. 1962).
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Another objection raised to employer access to the grievance
procedure is that the threat of a large money judgment obtained in
court against a union for breach of the no-strike clause is the only
effective deterrent to such breaches.24 This objection is usually based
on a claim that arbitrators will not, in comparison to courts, award
sufficient damages to make the employer whole, nor will they award
punitive damages. Before these claims are examined, however, it
should be pointed out that judgments in court, not arbitrator's
awards, may actually be the will-o'-the-wisp. An employer whose
business has been halted by a strike may be angry enough, at first,
to vigorously pursue his damage remedy. But it is a well known fact
that the vast majority of the damage suits filed in these cases are
quietly withdrawn as a part of the settlement of work stoppage. Very
few are fought through the long trial and the almost inevitable ap-
pellate procedure. Employers are simply more interested in operat-
ing their business than they are in pursuing fleeting legal remedies.
A local union, on the other hand, has no real choice but to fight all
the way. The only way it can call off the legal battle is to effect a
money settlement, usually a politically impossible choice. Further-
more, the local can usually rely upon considerable legal and mone-
tary assistance from its International and perhaps the AFL-CIO.
For these reasons, realistically speaking, the legal remedy is of
limited value to the employer.
One problem that the attorney faces when seeking to obtain
equitable relief to end a strike in breach of the collective bargaining
contract and obtain damages in court for the breach is the rule
established by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 5 The Court there
ruled that the Norris-La Guardia Act26 deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction to issue an injunction against such a strike, although
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act27
allowed federal courts to award damages in such a law suit. But state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.28 Cali-
fornia courts appear able to issue an injunction as well as grant
relief in damages.29 Therefore it becomes obvious that the employer's
attorney will look to the state, rather than the federal court, so that
he can obtain injunctive relief as well as his monetary damages. But
in that state court he will be met by defendant union's attorney who
24 Lewis, The Long Pause, 14 LAB. L.J. 276 (1963); Spelfogel, Enforcement of
No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Action and Discipline, 17 LAB. L.J. 67
(1962).
25 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
26 47 Stat. 70 (1932); 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
27 61 Stat. 156 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
28 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
29 McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315
P.2d 322 (1957); Gage Plumbing Supply Co. v. Local 300, International Hod Car-
riers, 202 Cal. App. 2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1962).
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will inform him that the action, since it could have originally been
brought in federal court, is now by defendant's motion being re-
moved8" to federal court where the injunction will fail. One possible
way out is for the employer's attorney to forego his claim for
damages, enter the state court and request only injunctive relief,
availing himself of the argument that the injunctive relief could not
have been brought in the federal court in the first place because
section 4 of Norris-La Guardia states that federal courts lack "juris-
diction" to issue such relief.8 ' Thus it is apparent that the employer
seeking both can obtain either equitable relief or a law suit for
damages, but not both. On the other hand, an attorney representing
an employer who had access to the grievance procedure may seek an
equitable relief from the immediate impact of the strike, and later
attempt to recover his damages in the grievance procedure.
Contrast the involved and exhausting route sketched above of
an employer law suit for damages in court with the procedure ob-
taining in an employer grievance under the collective bargaining
contract. As pointed out above, the time periods in the steps in the
grievance procedure are very brief. If the union resists, the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1280 through 1293 afford
summary proceedings for the enforcement of the obligation to arbi-
trate, the naming of an arbitrator, the procedure to be followed in
arbitration, and the confirmation of the award. The award, once
confirmed, is subject to attack only on very limited grounds. More-
over, it is difficult in a psychological sense for either party to resist
submitting a dispute to arbitration. This is the forum they are
familiar with. Arbitrators, in a sense, set the ground rules in the
industrial world.
Moreover, it is now well settled that arbitrators, absent an ex-
press contractual provision to the contrary, can and do award em-
ployers compensation damages for union's breach of a no-strike
clause.
As for the claim that arbitration awards are skimpy as com-
pared to court judgments, it must be noted that arbitrator's awards
in this area are relatively recent events, and like any other body of
precedent must be nurtured and cultivated. The word formula for
computing and measuring damages are the same in arbitration as
they are in the judicial forum.8" Cases of this nature that are
actually tried in court and reported in appellate proceedings must
80 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
81 See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 1027 (1963); and Report of the Committee on State
Labor Legislation, Labor Relations Law Section, American Bar Association (1965
Proceedings).




be, by the nature of the trial and appellate process, "big cases."
Conversely, the smallest sort of money award in arbitration will be
reported if the issues involved are anything but run of the mill.
Interestingly, a large award may not be published at all because one
of the virtues of arbitration is the lack of notoriety if the parties
desire to avoid it. Typically an arbitrator will not submit his award
and decision to the publishing services unless both parties consent to
it. And surprisingly, a very recent award allowed exemplary dam-
ages,88 though the same are not recoverable in court for a suit for
breach of the no-strike clause.84
One of the greatest benefits that the employer can obtain by
using the grievance procedure has little or nothing to do with ob-
taining an award that compensates him for damages, but frequently
involves a great deal more money than many damage claims-
whether in arbitration or in court. This benefit is the opportunity to
use the grievance procedure to obtain a decision on an unsettled but
controversial matter. Consider one particular arbitration, American
Pipe & Construction Company.8 5 There, although the Company filed
a grievance for damages and collected a modest sum, the Company
also filed a grievance and received a decision on a controversial issue
of contract interpretation. This controversial question touched off
the strike in the first place, but apparently the union involved chose
not to file a grievance and process its claim through arbitration.
Instead, the union chose to enforce its position by a work stoppage
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator
ruled that the Company's position on the contract interpretation
issue was correct-which may be why the union didn't file a griev-
ance in the first place. In any event, the issue was settled in favor
of the employer. The particular contract involved was a master
agreement covering hundreds of employees doing field construction
work in eight Western states, and if the employer had lacked access
to the grievance procedure, the controversy might still be going on
-being fought out or bluffed out one job at a time ! Similar unpub-
lished cases have been decided by other employer grievances. One
involved the right of an employer to assign an employee in an inter-
mediate pay grade to do work the union claimed could only be done
by a journeyman.8" Another involved a union claim that journeymen
who had traditionally furnished their own tools could, in concert,
88 Wanzer v. Teamsters, Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
84 Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d
Cir. 1962).
85 65-1 A.R.B. § 8480 (1964).
86 California Metal Trades Association on behalf of M. Greenberg's Sons. Ar-
bitrator Howard Durham (May 17, 1966).
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refuse to continue this practice.87 In neither case was the union
willing to test its theory by filing a grievance, but the employer was
able to push the issue into grievance and have the issue determined
in final and binding arbitration. In both of these latter cases the
employers were able to have the issue decided without a work
stoppage. In both the risk of a strike was exceedingly great if the
employer had followed the more traditional procedure of making the
assignment and daring the union to file a grievance, or had taken
disciplinary action against the recalcitrant journeymen who refused
to continue using their own tools.
Disciplinary action against employees has often been suggested
as the means of enforcing the no-strike clause. One commentator
suggests that the employer delete the no-strike clause and the arbi-
tration clause because sometimes arbitrators will set aside or modify
the disciplinary action the employer takes against employees for
violating the no-strike clause."8 This problem can be avoided and the
no-strike clause retained by providing by contract that those em-
ployees who violate the no-strike clause will be deemed to have quit
their employment. This in effect allows the arbitrator to find facts,
i.e., did the employee violate the clause or didn't he, rather than
review a typical discharge case and thereby decide, on policy
grounds, whether or not the employer's actions were "fair" or
amounted to "just cause." But disciplinary action against employees
is an even more illusory remedy for an employer than a law suit
against the union. Frequently the employees are not at fault, in the
sense that it is the union which has the quarrel (rightly or wrongly)
with the employer over some matter of contract interpretation. How
attractive is a remedy which provides that the employer will fire
most or all of his employees? Of course, the employer, theoretically,
at least, would have the right to hire replacements.89 But this may
be impossible. It will almost certainly be expensive, and it will
probably be distasteful.
CONCLUSION
The debate over employer grievances is far from ended. How-
ever the advantages to the employer of having this tool at his dis-
posal have so far largely been overlooked. The advantage of being
able to collect, in a summary proceeding in a forum that the union
itself favors, injunctive relief and a damage claim against the union,
plus the advantage of being able to force a decision on long smoulder-
37 Ampex Corporation, Arbitrator Sam Kagel (November 5, 1964).
88 Lewis, The Long Pause, 14 LAB. L.J. 276 (1963).
89 NLRB v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co., 96 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1938).
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ing but unresolved issues (and perhaps thereby avoid breaches of
the no-strike clause) are very real and practical. By contrast, the
disadvantage of the employer having access to the grievance pro-
cedure-risk of jeopardizing the availability to the employer of
equitable relief and loss of the money damages remedy in court-
are either speculative, as in the case of injunctive relief, or illusory
as in the case of a damage suit. Either or both claimed disadvantages
to use of the grievance procedure can be overcome by astute drafts-
men of the collective bargaining contract.
